Materialisme, vitalisme en psychologie

OUR problem is : What are the underlying desires, or wishes, that lead some scientists to insist upon mechanistic conceptions, and others equally eminent, to espouse some form of scientific vitalism ? For in psychology, as in other sciences, a materialistic or vitalistic bias may be found at the root of nearly all factional schools, or contentious groups. Sometimes, of course, the underlying desire relates solely to the advaffcement of the personal fortunes of the workers concerned; and such purely egoistic motives probably play a considerable part in the evolution of every scientific doctrine. In addition to this, however, originators and promulgators of conceptual

systems of thought, nearly always possess hidden desires to push science in this direction or that, " for science's own sake ". The goal selected is the one that accords most closely with the basic emotional set of the scientific agitator. And the emotional sets of scientists may be classified, broadly, into two elementary groups, materialistic and vitalistic.

The Mechanistic Set

Mechanists are " hard-boiled ". They are chronic sceptics* and must be shown. They pretend to base all their conclusions upon material evidence, and seldom observe that their own aggressive disbeliefs in the existence of this or that are based upon temperamental rejection of the very proffered evidence which their creed holds sacred. Their rationalization of their own emotional bias runs something like this : Science is the study and exposition of material causation. " Material " means always " cruder, less complex forms of energy ". Therefore, true science is the study of the influence of simpler energy units upon more complex energy units. And, since we can account for everything we have experienced in tfcis way, why waste time imagining that there exists any other.type of

cause or causation ? The mechanistic doctrine is pithy, succinct, and easily understood. Like the emotional set of its adherents, the mechanistic doctrine is aggressive, selfassured, and makes for rapid and decisive action. Scientific results, like other types of reward, are attained by action. Materialism, therefore, has proved itself a very useful agent in turning man's intellect from arm-chair speculation, to

laboratory research.

The Vitalistic Set

Vitalism seems to associate itself very intimately with religion, and religion might be defined as an emotional police force for morals. The vitalises basic emotional set is subtler, more complex, and harder to define than is that of the materialist. It seeks a more ultimate good for the self, and, at the sa*e time, desires opportunity to dispense loftier cheer to others. If mere physical fact interferes, at any point, with vitalism's sacred purposes, then escape is taken to the heights of imagination, where no physical facts exist. Nor do these occasional excursions prove wholly futile. Often the fugitive from reality returns to earth with new and usable inspiration. Physical facts frequently turn out to be chameleons, changing to richer and more varied colours under more vivid illumination.

In rationalizing his underlying desires for science, the vitalist remains true to form, starts with a priori assumptions, and ultimately descends to facts. He assumes, to begpn with, that physical phenomena cannot adequately be accounted for as mere results of physical causes. Therefore, it seems, we must further assume the existence of a first cause, or superphysical influence of unknown attributes. Granting the existence ol such an ultra-material agent, it is easy to assert that " He " produces, emanates, or is physical consciousness. From this point on, the vitalist descends into the same world with the materialist. Only, vitalistic causation proceeds in an opposite direction. Consciousness is a more complex, more ultimate form of being than is organic matter; which, in turn, is more complex and potent than are inorganic energy units.

Complex energy forms are regarded by the vitalist as more compelling than the cruder units. It is held, therefore, that higher fenergy units are the causes, and that simpler energy units aVe effects. " God made man in His own image ", and

set him to rule over the beasts of the field. The beasts, in turn, rule the vegetables, and so on down the line. Science is conceived of by the vitalist as a study and description of the causal influences of the higher upon the lower, the more complex upon the simpler, the more conscious upon the less animate. This doctrine is utterly repellant to many scientists, because it bases itself, initially, upon sheer, unproved assumption, and because, with equal naivetd, it ignores countless instances, appearing in every day life, wheie determinative influences are exercised by cruder forms of matter upoji human consciousness itself, which the vitalist regards as the highest known form of energy.

Existence of Mechanistic-Type Causes and Vitalistic-Type

Causes

On the other hand, physical scientists who desire, IUF- selfconsciously, to uplift their fellow humans, endure with difficulty the thought that the destiny of mankind rests supinely in the power of the unbound electron. Mechanistic determinism is abhored just as whole-heartedly by many a man

of letters who sees no logical escape from its tentacles, as it is by " fundamentalist " preachers who see in the triumph ot materialism a prospective loss of their own bread and butter. Most dreaded of all mechanistic tenets, apparently, is Darwinian evolution. That monkey has made man in his own image is % felt to be a degrading thought. Why? Because such a conclusion is taken to mean that man, once made, continues to be controlled by the same elementary forces which originally produced him. But biological evolution, even if true, entails no such implications. Monkey (or the common ancestor), may have caused man to evolve into his present form; but man, on the other hand, can now create new types of monkeys at will, by exercising a controlling influence over their breeding habits. And this is the very type of causation idealized by the vitalists. Man, the complex, sets causes in motion which influence the nature of monkey, the simpler animal. Moreover, while the materialistic supposition that monkey originally created man is beyond our present powers of verification, the influence exercised by man over monkey can be observed, any day, in the laboratory. In this argument, at least, we must concede that the vitalists' variety of causation is more solidly upheld by facts than is the median-

io EMOTIONS OF NORMAL PEOPLE

istic type of cause raised by materialists to epic grandeur in the saga of biological evolution. We must admit that while the vitalists begin their theorizing with fictional flights, the materialists conclude their doctrines with an almost equally speculative sublimation of their underlying emotional set.

Also, in justice to both, it may be said that the vitalistic account of causation is just as much an accurate observation of physical fact, as is the mechanistic account. Simpler energy units constantly influence more complex units, and may, under favourable conditions, control their behaviour, while more intricate assemblages of force, by virtue of new attributes derived from their complexity, as constantly compel comliance from cruder types of matter, and do, under our very eyes, completely regulate the simpler energy forms.

-""Physical science must and does include both mechanistic and vitalistic types of causation.

Science Musi Describe Both Types of Causes

We do not know as a matter of actual observation how organic forms of energy originate. We do know, however, that such energy units exist, and that any life-possessing unit exercises spontaneous influences over inorganic matter throughout its life span. These influences are in every sense vitalistic-type causes. Even inorganic matter may spontaneously generate causes of this same type. Radio-active metals, for instance, emanate energy particles regardfess of the nature of the environment in which these emanations take place. Physical science, without doubt, is held accountable for a full description of these phenomena.

At the same time, life-possessing units of matter, such as plants and animals, are constantly undergoing modification as a resu^: of stimuli which impinge upon their organisms from the less complex material units of their environment. Simple, but intensely energized forces like wind or waves may destroy

plant or animal organisms altogether; or such forces may influence in conclusive manner the growth or movements of the more complex animal and plant organisms. In the case of inorganic matter, acids or single chemical elements vastly less complex in themselves than the radio active metals, may t attach and destroy the latter, or may hasten or retard the radio* activity. These are mechanistic-type causes acting

MATERIALISM, VITALISM, AND PSYCHOLOGY n

determinatively upon energy units more complex than

themselves.

Interaction of Mechanistic Type and Vitalistic-Type Causes

In addition to such wholly separable types of causation, science has still to deal with the interaction of vitalistic and mechanistic causes. It is in the discussion of influences interacting between complex and simple energy units that the greatest confusions and conflicts of scientific analysis arise. For instance, let Us suppose that science is called upon to describe the plant growing in a field. It can be shown definitely that the soil is delivering a continuous series of chemical stimuli to the plant. It is equally ascertainable that the plant reacts to these stimuli with a series of reactions peculiar to its own inherent nature. Some of these plant responses will result in the delivery of counter stimuli to the soil and some will not. Those influences which are exercised by the pl~%t over the soil will, for the most part, alter the soil in ways determined by the chemical power of the plant. In so far, therefore, as soil and plant interchange influences, it may fairly

be said that the more complex units of energy composing the plant will dominate the interplay of causal forces.

But, as we have noted, there will be many changes in the plant, as a result of reactions to soil stimuli, which will not direct any influence back toward the earth. Were these plant changes directed by the soil to its own ultimate benefit, then we might clearly assume that the simpler form of energy was in causal control of the more complex energy unit. That is to say, if the soil were able to use the more complex energy of the plant to effect its own enlargement, simply by stimulating the plant to act according to the plant's own principles of action, we might conclude that, after all, the balance of control lay with the simpler unit of energy. This would amount to philosophical admission that mechanistic causation holds the balance of power. But such does not appear*to be the case. Though stimulated to action by the soil, the plant reacts with its own energy according to its own innate principles of action, and with reaction tendencies designed for its own ultimate benefit. With innate power to develop spontaneously throughout its own life cycle, with a balance of power of interaction capable of changing the soil more radically than the soil can change it, and, finally, with a structure designed in such a way as always to react for its own benefit

when stimulated to action by the soil, we are forced to conclude that the plant is a more potent generator of effective causes than is the soil. In short, a close logical analysis of influences interacting between complex and simple energy units would

seem to show that the responses of the simpler unit are dependent to a greater extent upon the causal control of the more complex form of matter, than are the reactions of the latter upon the former. If a balance is to be struck, then, upon the basis of empirical observation^ between vitalistic and mechanistic types of causation, we should be obliged to concede to the vitalistic causes the final balance of power. But science is not called upon to strike any such balance; it is merely required to describe both types of causation, neglecting neither the one nor the other.

Complex Matter-Units Possess Greatest Causal Power

In the large, we may put the matter somewhat as follows. Science finds, in this world, units of energy of varying complexity. It finds that the complex units are capable ol exerting spontaneous influences upon the simpler units, and vice versa. It finds that simple and complex units customarily interact, each causing changes in the other. The balance of power, on the whole, in this interchange of causal influences, lies with the more complex energy accretions. Even supposing, by way of illustration, that lead was once responsible for the evolution of uranium, it seems now the fact that radio-active metal can create lead under our own observation; while lead, if it still possesses evolutionary power, manifests it in too small a degree to be detected with available instruments. Perhaps inorganic compounds, millions of years ago, evolved plant structures. But now, at least, vegetable growths alter the entire composition of their nurturing soils, in the course of a few seasons; while the ability of the chemical influence of the soil to change the fundamental characteristics of plant life is extremely uncertain. Monkey-like primates may have given rise, in the long ago, to genus homo; but there is now little comparison between the influence that man is capable of

exerting over ape behaviour, and that which monkeys may bring to bear upon man. It seems to be a principle of nature that once a more complex form of energy appears, it forthwith possesses greater causal power over simpler forms of energy than the simpler forms possess over it.

But the mere fact that a quantitative majority of causations are of vitalistic type, does not in the least mean that science can neglect the huge, co-existing volume of mechanistic-type causations. Both aspects of causal description are required in all sciences. In physics, for example, which seeks to describe the most ultimate, or elementary reaction tendencies of matter, the attempt is now being made to resolve all complex masses into ultra-simple proton and electron systems. The influence of each proton-electron microcosm, then, must be traced in its most far-reaching effects upon the physical behaviour of the macrocosmic mass of which it forms a single unit. The causal influences of the total mass, on the other hand, upon its constituent proton-electron systems, and upon other free-lance proton-electron systems, must be described.

Chemistry, starting with already complex units of matter, the atom and the molecule, seeks to describe the causal effect of atoms upon molecules, and of molecules upon their constituent atoms, and upon other atoms, free 01 in other molecular systems of combination. Complexly organized groups of molecules, also, are studied by chemistry, which attempts to trace the influences which single molecules exercise upon

organic and inorganic compounds, and the causal effects of such compounds upon the simpler, molecular units.

From chemistry we step over the border line between inorganic and organic matter into the field of the sciences which deal with living organisms. In botany an attempt is made to analyze plant structures into cellular units. The effects of these units, together with the influences of still simpler inorganic units upon complex plant structures is then considered. Slightly more important, perhaps, is the description of the manner in which plants utilize and react upon their environment. In the general science of biology, which serves as an introduction to the more highly specialized physiological sciences, it is interesting to note that animal organisms are classified into phyla, genera, and species, upon the basis of the type of action which each animal exerts upon its environment, rather than according to the effect which inorganic or vegetable environment exerts upon the animal. Both aspects of scientific description are important in biology, however, as we have seen them to be in the other sciences.

With the advent of the highly specialized physiological sciences, we find a group of studies whose special objfect is

I 4 EMOTIONS OF NORMAL PEOPLE

analysis and description of man himself. Animal organisms below the complexity level of man are, of course, constantly utilized in the physiological laboratory; but such animal subjects are studied in order to apply the knowledge thus gained to further understanding of man. In other words,

the purpose of the physiological sciences has become frankly vitalistic as to type of causation emphasized. It is desired to know how man reacts upon and utilizes animals less complex than himself, as well as to learn the influences which he is able to wield over his vegetable and inorganic environments. This underlying purpose of the human scientist appears greatly to disturb mechanistic -minded writers and investigators, and the repeated attempt is made to assert the equal scientific importance of animal and botanical results regardless of their ultimate bearing upon analyses of man's own creative tentLncies. Similarly, attempts are frankly made by materialistically biased persons to assert that man's behaviour is determined in its entirety by the influences exerted upon it by units of energy simpler than man himself.

The truth of this assertion may be tested by examination of the nature of the nervous impulses by which, it is generally conceded, man's bodily conduct is initiated and controlled. Nerve impulses were formerly thought of as electrical disturbances. The energy travelling along a given nerve was conceived of as an outside force imposed upon the nerve by an environmental or physiological stimulus; that v is, by a stimulus less complex in energy organization than the nerve itself. Neurologists have subsequently discovered, however, that the nature of a nervous impulse is wholly dependent upon the potential energy already contained within the nerve fibre. A nervous impulse is now described as a series of explosions, 1 2 dependent for their intensity and volume, not upon the intensity of the physical stimulus, but rather upon the intrinsic structure of the particular nerve fibre stimulated. The

1 K Lucas, The Conduction of the Nerve Impulse, London, 1917, p 23.

1 A Forbes, " The Interpretation of Spinal Reflexes in Terms of Present Knowledge of Nerve Conduction, " Physiological Reviews, vol ii, July, 1922, p 367 : "It has been likened to the burning of a train of gunpowder, in contrast with the transmission of a sound wave whose energy comes entirely from its initiating source This fact, now well established, should put an end to all efforts to explain the nerve impulse simply as a transient current of electricity conducted along the fibre on thesame principle as in an insulated wire; the dynamics of the two modes of conduction are fundamentally different,"

function of the physical stimulus is limited to an initial release of nervous energy accumulations more complex than itself. In no sense is the nervous impulse determined by, or causally dependent upon the less complex physical stimulus to which it responds, except in the single particular that the physical stimulus is responsible for the origin of the nervous impulse. Once the nervous impulse appears, it proceeds to operate on its owil energy and according to its own rules of behaviour, like all other complex forms of energy. The mechanistic thinker assumes that causal responsibility for the origin of the more complex form of energy implies subsequent' control of the more complex unit throughout its life span. Only if

such continuous control were exercised by the simpler over the more complex could this world be regarded as uniformly mechanistic. As a matter of fact, however, the moment a more complex energy unit, such as the nervous impulse, iscalled into being, it forthwith assumes control of its own behaviour, and, to a considerable extent also, it exercises control over the behaviour of the stimulus energy unit.

The analysis of human emotions hereinafter set forth will, I trust, clearly show that man, the most complex of unit organisms, is similarly independent of, and influential over, the environmental stimuli which initially call into being his

responses.

Assignments of the Sciences

Psychology is the youngest and most undeveloped of the specialized, man-describing sciences. What is psychology's peculiar assignment ? What especial group of energy units must psychology examine, both with respect to the influences exerted upon these units by simpler forms of matter, and with respect to manipulations of simpler forms by the units described by psychology ? Physiologists, as we have seen, undertake to examine the effects of environment upon bodily tissues and organs. They also seek to discover the actions of the organs themselves upon the various vegetable and mechanical forces of matter which they contact. Neurology, which is also a comparatively new branch of science, is particularly interested in the effects of bodily organs and tissues upon the net-work of neurons constituting the so-called nervous system.

More particularly is neurology interested in the influences exerted by nervous impulses over the various organs and tissues

of the body. Is there any stabilized form of energy more complex than the nervous impulse ? The common sense answer to this question is " Yes, Consciousness ".

Psychology's A ssignment

Physiologists, neurologists, psycho-physiologists and possibly psycho-analysts, substantially agree with this answer. All these types of investigators assume, either tacitly or explicitly, that consciousness is a manifestation of energy which exists and reacts as a unit separate from mere intra-neuronic disturbance. If this separate existence of the phenomenon consciousness be conceded, then psychology's especial task must be the description of this most complex form of energy. And psychology, like all other sciences, must proceed to the analysis and description of both causal aspects of its subject.natter. The effects of nerve impulses upon consciousness must be discovered and analyzed. None-the-less importantly must the influences of consciousness upon nervous impulses be studied Through the mediumship of its influence upon nervous energy consciousness will, of course, act upon bodily tissues, and through the mediumship of bodily tissues, consciousness will be found ultimately to influence the organism's physical environment. To leave out any of these essential causal

media which are interposed between consciousness and physical environment must be to leave a gap in the totality of scientific description. Such gaps usually make for inaccuracy. Therefore, it would seem sensible for psychology to base itself first of all upon neurology, relying upon the description of nerve impulse behaviour furnished by workers in that field. Thus may psychology find more or less ready-made its points of departure and application.

If psychology's assignment be consciousness, and if consciousness lies in immediate contact with nervous energy, then the physiological changes which can be discovered in bodily organs and the observable physical movements of the body itself may be utilized for psychology's purposes in two ways. In the first place, bodily movements may be regarded as possibly symptomatic of a preceding psycho-neural cause. The proof of the existence of this primary, conscious-cause should not, as will later be set forth in detail, depend upon introspective observations. Definitive, objective criteria,ba?ed upon known structures and functions of the particular median-

isms of consciousness, should be used always in deciding whether observed body changes or movements are the result of consciousness or not. In the second place, if such a change or movement is not the result of consciousness, it might still prove of interest to psychology as a causal originator of consciousness. That is to say, measurable bodily changes and movements may represent the simpler energy unit causes of

the generation of consciousness, or they may represent causes of its modification. **Again we must emphasize the fact that bodily changes may or may not influence consciousness, and that the issue of whether consciousness has, in faCt, been changed is to be decided as far as possible upon objective, rather than upon introspective data.

In summary, then, measurable bodily changes and observable bodily movements may be of value to the psychological investigator in one of two ways. First, it is possible that th psychologist may use the bodily change as an indicator of pre-existing consciousness. In that case consciousness is treated as a vitalistic-type cause, the effect of which is the bodily movement. Or, secondly, measured modifications may prove of value to the investigating psychologist as indicators of the consciousness which is to follow. In this case the bodily changes represent a mechanistic type cause of which

the alteration of consciousness is a predictable result.

Tyfies of Causes Emphasized by Different Schools of Emotion Investigators

With such a preliminary view of psychology as that just outlined, we find ourselves in a position to consider the various aspects of psychology's task in which different types of workers specialize.

Psycho-Physiologists

The psycho-physiologists may be regarded as investigators who are trying to make careful laboratory measures of intrabodily changes. More especially do we find this type of researcher emphasizing the mechanictically causal aspect of his data. That is, the psycho-physiologist seems especially concerned with trying to describe the consciousness resulting from the physiological changes measured. Following this "bias, perhaps, psycho-physiological workers have long striven in vain to prove that bodily changes constitute mechanistic-

i8 EMOTIONS OF NORMAL PEOPLE

type causes of resulting sensations, and that these sensations are emotion (James-Lange theory).

On the other hand, a limited number of psycho-physiological researchers have tried to utilize physiological measures as symptoms, or indicators of previously existing emotional causes. Association reaction-time tests, systolic blood-pressure deception tests, and galvanometric emotion-detecting tests may be listed as investigations of this type. Bodily changes, thus regarded, are tacitly treated as resultS'of emotion impulses acting as vitalistic-type causes. Though physiological psychologists have been severely handicapped by the senseless assumption that all consciousness is, in its final essence, composed of sensation, they have, on the whole, shown no prejudicial bias toward limiting the use of their results by regarding them either as exclusive!}' mechanistic-type causes or as ex-

Thisively vitalistic-type causes. In short, the psycho-physiologists, for the most part, have made their bodily measurements, or they have recorded their subjects 1 introspections as carefully, and they have icf rained from dogmatic assertion as to the type of causal conception, if any, existing between their two sets of data.

Mental-T ester-Statisticians

It is more difficult to place the mental-tester-statistician within the field of psychology as we have attempted to outline it. One is tempted to believe, at times, that this type of person is not working in the field of psychology at all. Yet even if this conclusion were justified, it would still remain true that the statistical-testing type of result is throwing invaluable side lights upon many strictly psychological problems. It is difficult to find intrinsic psychological meaning in the statement that Thomas Brown has made an army alpha score of 200. There exists, so far as I know, no available key to the different elements of consciousness involved in securing 200 on that particular test, nor is there an extant compendium detailing the psycho-neural mechanisms of causation employed by the subject in obtaining this unusually high score. The prevailing mental test meaning of the score is merely that Thomas Brown has complied with and dominated an arbitrarily fixed set of tasks considerably more effectively than several million other persons have been able to do. If one would utilize this result in a truly psychological analysis of

Brown, one must guess 'what psycho-neural mechanisms were called into play in this particular individual by the tasks imposed. Such an application of a test score to psychology is not as difficult as it sounds. After a little practical experience with tests, one comes to realize that certain characteristics of consciousness such as speed of reaction and finesse of compliance emotion are necessary to the making of a high test score. This is the sort of rough and ready analysis of test results into heterog^neously named " mental traits " at which mental test specialists become extremely expert. To a genius like Thorndike, for example, who has spent many years in analyzing mental test results, the psychologically suggestive values of test tabulations are tremendous, if one may judge from his theoretical contributions to the psychology of learning. Accepting, then, this suggestive value of mental tests, rather than the statistical formulation of their results, as the chief psychological value of this method of investigation, we may regard mental test procedures as specializing in the vitalistictype of psychological causation. The bodily performances of the persons tested are treated as symptomatic of consciousness energy and nervous energy acting as vitalistic-type causes of the behaviour measured.

Behaviourists

John B. Watson states 1 that in 1912 the behaviourists decided either to give up psychology or else to make it a natural Lcience. Many people are now inclined to believe that Watsonian behaviourists have carried out not one but both of these threats. Certainly Watson's mechanistic bias, backed by his extraordinarily keen scientific observation, has accom-

plished wonders in converting psychology into an objective science. But, at the same time, there is considerable evidence that Watson himself has given up psychology altogether. In his latest text, he defines the subject matter of hianan psychology as " the behaviour or activities of the human being " but he explicitly excludes consciousness from human behaviour and activity. If Watson should succeed in this bob-tailing of psychology, he would have talked himself out of a job. For neuronic activity has been assigned to the neurologist, body tissue activity to the physiologist, and classification

1 J B Watson, Behaviorism, New York and London, 1925, p 16. 1 J. B. Watson, ibid., p. 3.

of gross bodily behaviour of all anirtials, including man, to the general biologist. It might be possible, of course, for psychology to appropriate to itself the last-named function of biology in so far as it relates to the genus homo. In such case psychology would act as a sort ol clearing house for the facts of neurology and physiology, with a department for the release of composite motion pictures of whole human beings in action. But behaviourists, as a matter of fact, have not behaved as though acting upon such a concept of their scientific task. Watson, for instance, has reported to the literature many carefully controlled experiments in which he sought to analyze and explain the intra-bodily mechanisms by which the final gross actions were brought about. Watson himself,

of course, is now devoting himself to business, and his recent expressions of lack of interest in attempting to describe the more intricate bodily mechanisms of response (particularly those of the central nervous system) are probably attributable to his personal lack of time for laboratory experimentation, rather than to any radical shift in scientific attitude. On the whole, then, we may conclude that the Watsonian type of behaviourism is merely a mechanistically motivated attempt to turn psychology into objectively scientific channels by the simple expedient of eliminating whatever type of subject matter the behaviourists feel themselves incapable of describing. That the phenomenon eliminated chanced to be con-,, sciousness is unfortunate for " behaviourism ", not for psychology. *

If, then, we dare to assume, in the very teeth of the behaviouristic tempest, that consciousness is a very complex but stabilized form of energy which must be included in the " activities of the human being ", we may conclude that Watson and his allies would be especially interested in the control which physical environment and bodily tissues exercise over consciousness. Watson insists that only mechanistictype causes exist He regards the central nervous system as a mere off-shoot of the other bodily tissues which control it completely; and he furthermore states that the responses of both bodily tissues and nervous system are wholly at the mercy of the physical environment, just as Atalanta found herself wholly at the mercy of the golden apples. 1 Almost

1 J. B. Watson, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, 1919, ' Philadelphia and London, p. 3.

in the next paragraph, however, Watson attempts to show how the human race can throw off its thraldom to religious and social convention and other environmentally determined influences. He has recently maintained that no more children should be brought into the world until parents have learned enough about them to regulate each child's life according to the principles of the child's own nature, physical, mental, and emotional. Surely no more striking faith in the potencies of vitalistic-type causation can be found than this statement ! If human consciousness were truly controlled by less complex energy forms of the environment, such dreams for human self-regulation would be sheer madness. The actively potent cause in the programme which Watson advocates is the complex human consciousness of parents, which, when it has been made still more complex by added knowledge, \\ atson hopes can control and modify the simpler consciousness of the child. It was not really the apples which over-powered Atalanta, but the more complex consciousness of Milanion who dropped the apple?. It seems to me probable, therefore, in light of this unintentional self-revelation on Watson's part, that we may, after all, expect the master " behaviourist " to lay fully as much emphasis upon analysis of vitalistic-type causes as upon purely mechanistic descriptions. These two aspects of any science are, of course, inseparable. And it is not reckless to predict that the behaviourists of to-day may be transfer ned completely into the psycho-physiologists ol to-morrow if procedures for objective examination and description of consciousness can be perfected.

Psycho- A nalysts

Lastly, we may consider, briefly, the causal emphasis to be found in the doctrine of psycho-analysis. The psychoanalysts seem to take an especial interest in the control which various conflicting and distorted elements of consciousness exercise over human conduct. This clearly is a vitalistictype of causation. Yet when we penetrate one step further into the psycho-analytical teachings, we discover that the offending conscious elements themselves are regarded as being the product of still another type of entity, the libido. If, then, the libido turns out to be a mass of unconscious, physical, or physiological energy, the whole foundation of the psychoanalytical system must be regarded as thoroughly mechanistic.

If, on the other hand, the libido is discovered to partake of the nature of consciousness itself, we might conclude that a vitalistic theme of causation runs back into the very heart of the psycho-analytical doctrine.

The effects which physical objects and environmental situations are supposed to have upon the emotional consciousness of children constitute instances of purely mechanistictype causation. That is to say, the psycho-analysts teach that the emotional consciousness of young children is peculiarly susceptible to being controlled, perverted, and mis-directed by irresistible effects produced upon it by less complex forms of matter in the physical environment. As the individual

grows older his consciousness is thought to be less susceptible to damage or perversion from such causes, although when the libido meets with environmental enemies, these outside antagonists may exercise more control over the subject's consciousness than does the libido itself. On the whole, we may characterize psycho-analysis as a system of thought which assumes a continuous state of bodily conflict between the vitalistic-type causes, having their origin in the libido or in consciousness itself, and the mechanistic-type causes springing from environmental stimuli. The psycho-analyst's avowed intention is to ally himself with the self-controlling conscious causes existing in a subject, for the purpose of defeating the, mechanistic, environmental causes. These material influences are to be brought, if possible, into harmony with the human being's own nature. We may, perhaps, draw a general conclusion that the psycho-analyst believes psychology to be a s+udy of the conflict between vitalistic-type causes and mechanistic-type causes, in so far as such causes relate to consciousness.

Summary

It may be well to summarize the causal emphasis of investigators making the most important contributions to psychology of emotions as follows : Psychologists who seek to make simultaneous laboratory examination of consciousness as reported introspectively, and of physiological changes in the subjects' body as measured by instruments of precision, are usually interested equally in mechanistic-type causes and vitalistic-type causes. These workers need not, and often

do not, commit themselves very definitely as to whether

consciousness has caused bodily change, or bodily change has controlled consciousness. No fault can be found with this position, though a hope may be expressed that psychophysiologists may manifest a little more boldness in the causal interpretation of their results, once consciousness has come to be definitely recognized as a form of physical energy.

Mental-tester-statisticians, working by a method which produces psychologically suggestive results of considerable value, may be saidto seek causes of vitalistic-type in so far as test results are regarded as revelatory of existing consciousness or conscious tendencies.

Watsonian behaviourists, though ostensibly and aggressively mechanistic in their present propaganda, are found, nevertheless, to possess the most practical interest of all in vitalistic-type causation. For these behaviourists maintain that human beings, who are the most complex of physical energy units, possess the ability wholly to free their own behaviour from environmental control.

The psycho-analyst takes especial interest in the relations existing between mechanistic-type causation and vitalistictype causation. The existing relationship between these antithetical types of causal influence is conceived by the psycho-analyst to be one of conflict, and this conflict he would

resolve in favour of the vitalistic-type causes. Of all classes V)f thinkers contributing to the problem of emotional theory, the psycho-analyst seems to be alone in his explicit recognition of the simultaneous existence of both types of causation, and of the scientific necessity for psychology to deal with both,

Psychology of Emotion Tentatively Defined

Applying our conclusions with regard to mechanism, vitalism, and psychology to the psychology of emotions, we may suggest a tentative definition of our prospective field of research. Psychology of emotion is the scientific description of affective consciousness. " Scientific description ", as hereinbefore set forth, must include discovery and exposition of both mechanistic-type and vitalistic-type causes and their interactions within the field defined.

Concretely, we may expect to trace the origin of emotion to mechanistic-type causes; that is, to nerve impulses, thence to bodily changes and, ultimately, to environmental stimuli. These three types of cause constitute simpler forms of energy

than does consciousness itself. We may also expect to find that many elements of emotional consciousness are terminated by these same mechanistic-type causes. Unfortunately, also, we may feel rather sure that the conditioning of emotional consciousness upon environmental stimuli will be found under the control, for the most part, of mechanistic-type influences. That is to say, we shall find that the quality of emotional

consciousness which responds to and reacts upon a given environmental stimulus frequently has been determined by chance repetition of that stimulus, or by the conditions under which the stimulus first happened to be presented to the subject, by his inanimate environment. If such be the case, the inanimate object, or simpler form of energy, is exercising complete control over the nature of the emotional response, and indirectly over the subsequent type of influence exerted back again upon environment by the emotional consciousness evoked. This type of causation remains predominantly mechanistic throughout.

On the other hand, we must be prepared to regard bodily expressions of emotional consciousness as vitalistically caused by the conscious energy itself. In other words, we must not forget that physical or physiological behaviour which we regard as symptomatic of emotional consciousness, is truly a result of the physical causation set up by the emotion energy. Emotional consciousness is to be regarded as a vitalistic-type cause whenever it expresses itself by modification of simpler forms of energy such as nerve impulses, bodily tissues, or unconscious objects of environment. We may expect, furthermore, to find emotional consciousness acting as a vitalistic-type cause over its own less complex units. Larger and more complex units of emotional consciousness may causally control simpler units of consciousness by the round-about method of compelling nerve impulses, and, through their mediation, compelling environmental stimuli to manufacture new units of emotional consciousness made to order, as it were. Thus we find that

the complete control of one's own emotional conditioning advocated by Watson may be brought about by vitalistictype causation controlling and using to its own purposes mechanistic-type causes. This method, rather than the method of mutual conflict between two existing units of emotional consciousness each acting as a vitalistic-type cause, seems to constitute the natural means of emotional self-control.

In short, emotional consciousness, acting as a vitalistic-type cause, may not only definitely influence nerve impulses, bodily states, and environmental forces, but it may also influence these simpler energy units in such a way that their powers of mechanistic-type causation shall be utilized to prolong or terminate the existing vitalistic-type cause emotional consciousness.

This detailed analysis of scientific causation as it appears in the psychology of emotion is intended as a preliminary determination of the requirements which any sensible theory of emotions must meet if it is to serve as a skeleton for research I may say, at this point, that I have not found the task of meeting these requirements an easy one. But when the re-.quirements are eventually met I believe that the resulting psychological structure should prove acceptable to all the divers cults of research contributors to the psychology of emotions. The benefit of such a truce in the present psychological civil war would be great, for it is only by the establishing

of a common working hypothesis that any substantial portion of these divers research contributions can be given meaning for all.